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Intuition in decision-making is often seen as a set of heuristic or holistic mental 
processes applied to decision problems when they exceed cognitive capacity, or 
whenever there is a will to achieve a solution that does not exhaust cognitive 
resources. In this regard, to date it has been solely treated as a personal and fre-
quently solipsist tendency. This paper tests whether different types of problems 
carry different degrees of ‘intuitiveness’ and whether it would be possible to 
produce a realistic experimental model of such problems. To cope with both de-
mands, standardized stimuli (mostly IAPS figures) were used to model decision 
problems as conflicts (approach-avoidance, approach-approach, and avoidance-
approach conflicts). Intuitiveness was argued to be inversely related to arousal, 
as measured by GSR levels. Several solutions to methodological problems in-
volving decision-making designs in the environment of the software BioExplorer 
were created. Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests were used to 
rank problems. According to our analyses, ap-av conflicts are by far less intuitive 
than av-ap, and av-av (p <.0001). The latter two are not very different in this 
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The psychology of decision-making under 
risk or uncertainty (Knight, 1921) has several 
points in common with the dynamics of conflict 
resolution. Choices are much like competitors, 
whose pros and cons struggle in a cost/benefit 
multidimensional mental framework. That is 
especially true when equilibrium among these 
dimensions (or ‘utility values’) prevails over the 
capacity to decide confidently.
A ‘feeling of knowing’ (FOK), that certain object 
or course of action is potentially more desirable 
than others, usually precedes self-assured choice 
selection (Koriat, 2000; Metcalfe, 1986). Such psy-
chological state becomes increasingly important 
in accordance with the importance attributed 
to the problem as a whole and it is not hard to 
foresee that it may become a source of distress 
when perceived as unachievable. Contrary to the 
assumption that the closer choices are to a state 
of equilibrium the greater will be the indifference 
of decision makers, decision problems which in-
volve valued issues tend to remain psychologically 
demanding in relation to the aim to achieve high 
levels of assurance, regardless of the impractica-
bility of such attempt. Outcomes may be hammed 
into uncertain probabilities of occurrence and 
incorporate considerable amounts of randomness 
(for stochastic unpredictability, see Gell-Mann, 
1995), and still remain psychologically appealing.
Self-assured choice selection sometimes be-
comes impracticable due to the set of variables 
involved in problem, which may outnumber the 
ones that we are able to manage (for a classic 
on heuristics and limitations of the capacity to 
evaluate and compare complex decision options 
see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Addi-
tionally, sometimes it becomes impracticable 
because options depend on events or decisions 
which are beyond prediction.
Despite existing limitations to reach FOK 
experiences in all cases, it is clear that most peo-
ple tend to have the capacity to select an option 
in most cases. This has an important function 
to the preservation of the psychological equili-
brium, as it avoids the negative psychological 
and practical consequences of procrastination 
(for an introduction to this matter: Ferrari, Jo-
hnson, & McCown, 1995; Ferrari & McCown, 
resumen
La intuición en la toma de decisiones se asume con frecuencia como un conjunto de 
procesos mentales heurísticos u holísticos que se aplican a la toma de decisiones 
cuando exceden la capacidad cognitiva, o cuando se quiere obtener una solución que 
no agote recursos cognitivos. En este sentido, se ha tratado este tema hasta ahora 
sólo como una tendencia personal y con frecuencia solipsista. El presente trabajo 
se propone probar si diferentes tipos de problemas llevan consigo diferentes grados 
de “intuición”, así como plantearse si sería posible producir un modelo experimental 
realista de dichos problemas.  Con el fin de atender a ambos requerimientos se uti-
lizaron estímulos estandarizados (mayormente imágenes del Sistema Internacional 
de Imágenes Afectivas – IAPS) para modelar problemas que demandasen una deci-
sión a manera de conflictos (conflictos de tipo aproximación-evitación, aproximación-
aproximación y evitación-aproximación). Se arguye que la intuición se relaciona de 
manera inversa con la activación cuando se la mide por niveles de respuesta galvá-
nica de la piel (GSR). Se crearon así varias soluciones a los problemas metodológicos 
que involucraban diseños de toma de decisiones en el ambiente del Software BioEx-
plorer. Se utilizaron las pruebas de Kruskal-Wallis y de Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon 
con el fin de clasificar los problemas.  A la luz de nuestros análisis, los conflictos 
de aproximación-evitación (ap-av) son de lejos menos intuitivos que los conflictos de 
tipo evitación-aproximación (av-ap) y evitación-evitación (av-av) (p < .0001) los dos 
últimos no fueron significativamente diferentes en este aspecto (p = .5712).
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1994), and much in this sense there are known 
affective biases in rational decision-making, 
which tend to increase the utility attributed 
to selected options after a decision has been 
made - a trend known as confirmation bias (De 
Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; 
Nickerson, 1998).
From a strictly rational point of view, one 
may consider that naive people tend to be par-
ticularly skilled in deluding themselves to be-
lieve that their decisions dominate the course 
of the future more than they really do (Koriat, 
Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). But how do 
we reach the necessary confidence to generate 
the psychological experience of a FOK, when 
noticing the randomness of future events or 
the absence of necessary information to achieve 
such a state by way of a sequence of cognitive 
processes capable of endorsing the superiority of 
an option? This paper will provide a partial and 
context-specific answer to this question, based 
upon the argument that this is precisely what 
“intuition” is all about. In our opinion, there 
are some non-trivial conceptions which must 
be presented in relation to these concepts so as 
to properly support our goal, and we will review 
them in this introduction.
Preference can be seen either as a behavioral 
dimension, as originally described by renowned 
preference theorists, (e.g., Samuelson, 1938), 
where preference of A over B is a conceptual 
translation of the observation that in the pres-
ence of both A and B, one chooses A; or as a 
mental dimension, where preference of A over 
B is the mental representation endorsing the 
opinion that in the presence of both A and B the 
former tends to be preferred (for a discussion, 
see Hausman, 2000).
The latter conception is clearly the one that 
matters in this context. Herein it is reasonable 
to assume that settling preference frequently 
involves a mental (time) travel (MTT) to hypothe-
tical scenarios of development of the concurrent 
courses of action that the agent infers from the 
options, as long as he/she is provided with 
sufficient information and time to mentally pros-
pect potential consequences of choice selection. 
Another condition is that the subject attributes 
enough importance to the problem as a whole, 
so as to invest cognitive energy in achieving the 
best possible solution. As stated by Hausman 
and McPherson (1994), preference is not just 
gut feeling; for a discussion on the application 
of the idea of MTT to the understanding of the 
psychology behind decision-making (see Boyer, 
2008).
There is a basic difference between the esta-
blishment of preference in such contexts to its 
establishment when mentalization is impossible, 
due to unpredictability (MTT is not possible, 
hampering the achievement of a FOK by such 
means), related to the fact that the latter case 
forces one to rely exclusively on gut feelings. 
This dependence on gut feelings defines a class 
of heuristic processes popularly known as in-
tuition (more specifically ‘holistic intuition’; for 
an experimental definition of holistic intuition, 
see Pretz & Totz, 2007), which is known to be 
particularly suited to confirmatory biases (Sim-
mons & Nelson, 2006).
Among the many old and new theories of 
intuitive processes in decision-making, a trend 
that has become popular is that the achievement 
of a FOK in contexts where choice selection as a 
byproduct of deductive or inductive operations 
is beyond the subject’s possibilities is accom-
plished along with or by means of transient 
electrophysiological shifts from stable states 
(Bechara, 2004; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 2005).
This trend is at the heart of the somatic 
marker hypothesis, which became popular after 
the creation of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) 
(Damasio, 1994). This game involves four piles 
of cards, whose pay-off is not only different (such 
that if all card values are revealed, options can 
be ordered in terms of their financial utility), but 
also involves different magnitudes of values (in 
such a way that the pile with the highest rewards 
and punishments has the worst overall pay-off).
In a famous series of experiments, Bechara 
et al. (2005), demonstrated that after selecting 
approximately half of the cards (during a game 
involving 4 decks and a total of 100 cards) nor-
mal people start to manifest a notable preference 
toward piles with the highest overall pay-offs (in 
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other words, they start to decide advantageously) 
and that this tendency tends to be present regar-
dless of their incapability to manifestly rank the 
piles in terms of their overall utility (Damasio, 
1994, Bechara et al., 2005).
The authors also added that the adaptive 
behavior that is observed is mainly guided by 
an intuitive FOK that one experiences along 
with the intention to select a pile and that such 
feeling of knowing that emerges without cons-
cious knowledge (a trend that they termed ‘know 
without knowing’) is related to anticipatory chan-
ges in galvanic skin response that guide card 
selection (GSR - a classical marker of autonomic 
activation, arousal, and stress) (Bechara, et al., 
2005; Damasio, 1994, 1996).
These anticipatory responses are characteri-
zed by increases in GSR levels, which are typical 
of increased arousal, due to higher sympathetic 
activity. Within the context of the game, this is 
experienced as stress responses, triggered as 
the decision agent considers the selection of 
cards from piles that had led to severely negative 
outcomes in previous rounds (Damasio, 1994).
The somatic marker hypothesis states that 
people avoid piles that trigger anticipatory stress; 
it also says that selection is intuitive, in that 
it is guided by a process of knowing with fully 
conscious knowledge. Once we add these two 
ideas together, we reach the perspective that 
the less advantageous piles with their associated 
anticipatory stress responses are less intuitive. 
Bearing that in mind, it is reasonable to 
consider the extent to which these piles with 
worst overall pay-offs can be designated as 
“less intuitive”, one may say that there is an 
inverse relation between the “intuitiveness” of 
an option and the degree to which it generates 
electrophysiological responses of stress. This is 
at the heart of the development that we propose.
Another idea that we would like to add is 
that the selection of options resemble the pro-
cess of solving a conflict among possible choices 
that compete in the mind for preference. As one 
may note, such conflict can be topologically 
represented as a demand to sequentially esta-
blish the fittest of a set of potential attractors, 
amongst which some start to lose their appeal 
after each round, much as theorized in classic 
conflict theory.
For instance, if we consider a two piles ver-
sion of the IGT and two initial choices that lead 
a decision agent to sequentially win some money 
(from both piles), the conflict to be solved by the 
next move (one which can be trivially reduced 
to the comparison of gains) can be defined as 
an approach-approach conflict.
In his classical attempt to systematize conflict 
theory, Lewin (1935) defined three elementary 
types of conflicts: avoidance-avoidance (av-
av), approach-approach (ap-ap) and approach-
avoidance (ap-av) (for critical discussion and 
additional information, see Atthowe Jr., 1960; 
Coombs & Avrunin, 1977). The most common 
way to define an av-av conflict is to say that it 
occurs in face of the necessity to select among 
two or more repulsive possibilities; for instan-
ce “either I stay at work until nine o’clock at 
night or I pick to be penalized by not having 
concluded my assignment”. An ap-ap conflict 
is characterized when the available options are 
all potentially positive; for instance deciding bet-
ween earning a new car or a sponsored vacation. 
Ap-av conflicts are a little more complex and 
can be said to happen in light of the necessity 
to decide when faced with goods whose positive 
and negative attributes tend to equilibrium. If the 
hypothetical IGT player that we depicted above 
was to continue playing to the point of winning 
and losing money from all piles, the structure 
of the psychological conflict that would emerge 
from thinking his subsequent decisions would 
change from ap-ap to ap-av.
the role of phenomenological Anchoring 
in realistic decision-making scenarios
The use of epistemological frameworks from 
conflict theory in decision-making analysis is not 
orthodox and was introduced here because we 
noticed that it allows the systematization of an 
important aspect of all naturalist decision-making 
dynamics, which has never been accomplished 
by available decision games and associated 
analysis: the relation established between the 
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state of affairs existent before exposure to the 
game’s options and the subsequent decision.
For instance, taken the topological represen-
tation of a conflict between negative options, a 
variation of the classic av-av decision conflict is 
defined and can be studied as such when someone 
making a choice whose valence he/she considers 
to be negative is faced with the necessity to trade 
it for one among a set of options that are also 
characterized by negative valence. That is, when 
considering the situation where a decision agent 
has to abandon a negative attractor in favor of 
a decision tree constituted of few other negative 
attractors. An av-av conflict can be seen when 
someone who has just lost their money gambling 
is faced with the options of either borrowing money 
from a gangster or skipping dinner and lunch.
Along the same lines of thought, one can 
think of a two-stage variation of the classic 
ap-av decision conflict, consisted a first phase 
where a positive attractor is presented and a 
second phase where the agent is forced to select 
one among several negative ones; for instance, 
after receiving a promotion someone is faced 
with the demand of either firing one of his clo-
sest colleagues or one of the most promising 
newcomers of the team.  As one may note, 
classic conflict theory has little to say about 
this kind of problem.
It is clear that these cases portrait much 
more realistic designs than most decision games 
(no matter whether they are zero-sum or non 
zero-sum), since they deal with the existence of 
both a pre-scenario and a decisional scenario. 
In real life, decision problems to which we are 
exposed do not emerge from previous “blank 
slates”, but emerge in the context where previous 
states of affairs already existed (since there is 
a phenomenological continuum in the realm of 
psychological experience). These affairs define 
a “psychological anchoring point”, that is, an 
angle from which the agent starts to consider 
the problem. Much as hunger affects consumers’ 
buying behavior (Mela, Aaron, & Gatenby, 1997), 
agents are generally anchored in pre-scenario 
contexts from which they start to consider any 
decision problem (for an introduction to ancho-
ring effects: Tversky & Kahneman,1974).
This very perspective opens a venue to stu-
dy the mysteries of intuition in a broad and 
significant manner: considering a multi-round 
decision task, characterized by the presence of 
pre-scenarios and decision scenarios paired in 
accordance with the above designations from 
conflict theory (av-av, ap-ap, ap-av); would it be 
possible to rank different “conflicts” in terms of 
their relative intuitiveness?
Which type of decision problem suits more 
easily the achievement of a FOK; one where we 
are forced to exchange a worthy possession for 
one of three new positive choices, one where we 
are forced to change it for one of three negative 
ones, or one where we are forced to change an 
unworthy possession for one of three other ne-
gative ones? Is there a specific naturalist context 
(pre-scenario to decision scenario design), where 
we tend to be more intuitive than others?
To provide an answer to such questions, it is 
necessary to generalize lessons from early IGT 
studies, which have pointed to the aforemen-
tioned inverse relation between “intuitiveness” 
(as easiness to select) and stress (measured as 
GSR level) to a broader sets of decision problems, 
including cases where there is neither a better 
option nor an actual, rational solution.
Considering such set of decision problems, 
we can assert a precise context where “intuition” 
can be used and scrutinized: once there is a 
problem designed to stimulate the agents’ inten-
tions to maximize the efficacy of their choices (at 
the same time that the options are designed to 
produce a state of equilibrium), and the problem 
as a whole is designed to be rigorously sheltered 
from the achievement of a rational solution, it is 
possible to take for granted the fact that choice 
selection will be forcedly based on gut feeling 
and will involve different degrees of easiness, 
related to the nature of the choice stimuli (e.g., 
selecting among negative valence options after 
dropping a positive pre-scenario; selecting among 
positive options, etc.).
 In this context, intuitiveness of a problem 
that involves a set of imponderable options can 
be assumed as inversely correlated to the curve 
drawn by the subject’s GSR level from the pre-
decision scenario (baseline) to the moment of 
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selecting an option in the decision scenario, in 
such a way that the initially unassailable problem 
of categorizing decision problems in terms of 
their potential to be solved intuitively turns out 
to be a matter of ranking conflict resolution in 
terms of baseline-to-peak GSR activation, from 
pre-scenario exposure to option selection. This 
conception is justified by the fact that the state of 
affairs (herein referred exclusively to stress level 
due to its unpaired relevance to the proposed 
question) manifested in pre-scenario represents 
the anchoring state from which option selection 
will be psychologically defined, in accordance 
with the phenomenological changes caused by 
the necessity to respond to this demand.
The objectives of this study are two-fold. On 
the one hand, this study seeks to introduce some 
new perspectives on the psychology of decision-
making, ad on the other to apply them experi-
mentally in order to investigate the possibility 
of ranking three elementary types of decision 
problems (herein conceived under the theoretical 
framework of classical conflict theory) in terms of 
the easiness of selecting an option, when there 
are no clues as to what option is better suited 
to satisfy the proposed demand and wherein the 
subjects are stimulated not to guess, but rather 
to deliberate in face of the achievement of a FOK.
Considering that the achievement of a FOK 
when the route to a rational or partially ratio-
nal solution is impossible calls for an intuitive 
deliberation, this study can be considered as a 
proposal to rank problems in terms of their in-
tuitive profiles. Thus it would aid in the develop-
ment of a new line of studies, which may apply 
to several other categories of decision problems, 
yet to be defined or systematized.
method
participants and experimental 
preparation
The study was conducted in compliance with 
the Declaration of Helsinki and its amendments 
(for a review: Lewis, Jonsson, Kreutz, Sampaio, 
& van Zwieten-Boot, 2002), and the norms of 
local institutional review board. The experimen-
tal protocol was approved by the local research 
ethics committee, and all patients provided 
written informed consent.
The experiment involved the voluntary par-
ticipation of 30 undergraduate (equally divided 
by sex) students from psychology, medicine 
and engineering courses of the University of 
Sao Paulo, Brazil, whose age ranged from 18 to 
28 years old (mean age: 23.4 years). Exclusion 
criteria were: (a) having less than 5 hours of 
sleep in the previous night; (b) suffering from 
strong psychological pressure; (c) use of drugs of 
abuse or alcohol in the previous three days; (d) 
history of psychiatric or neurological disorders; 
(e) obesity (observational criteria). These criteria 
were defined in face of findings reporting them 
to bias psychological and electrophysiological 
assessments (Groth-Marnat, 2009). A psychiatric 
inventory (mini-mental) was applied, while the 
other exclusion criteria were investigated in a 
semi-structured interview.  
 Participants undertook the test while sea-
ted in a comfortable chair in a quiet room. All 
had their second and third fingers of the non-
dominant hand attached to a GSR sensor (J&J 
Engineering Inc.) and were instructed to leave 
their dominant hand over the computer’s mouse, 
to easily advance the figures. The design was 
tested by each participant prior to the begin-
ning of data capture and we ensured that all 
had proper understanding of the instructions.
experimental design 
The experimental design introduced by this 
study is the result of improvements over an 
earlier version, used for a pilot study in this 
very year (unpublished data). It is built on the 
conception of decision problems as different 
types of conflicts, categorically defined from 
the pre-scenario to decision scenario, so that 
exposure to a stimulus of negative valence in 
the pre-scenario would categorize the problem 
as av-(), whereas a pleasing stimulus in the 
pre-scenario would categorize it as ap-(). Con-
versely, a set of unworthy stimuli in the decision 
scenario would categorize the problem as ()-av, 
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whilst a set of positive options would make it 
()-ap. We did not include av-ap problems, for 
reasons that will be made clear in due course.
The decision problems involved in this study 
are all non-declarative and were preceded by 
very simple instructions. The stimuli that defi-
ne the problems consist of images projected in 
a computer screen. Most of these images were 
selected from the IAPS inventory, while the re-
maining ones are public domain images taken 
from the internet. Three categories of images were 
included: human faces, landscapes/locations, 
and food; each of which appeared three times, 
leading to nine decision problems, categorica-
lly divided in three blocks. The categories were 
consistently maintained during all pre-scenario 
to decision scenario exposures. Presentation of 
the figures was not fully randomized, but only 
pseudo-randomized (in order to avoid categorical 
recurrence), and this created a mathematical 
proof that lack of complete randomization did 
not bias the results, as we will further consider. 
During each of the nine times that partici-
pants had to pick an image, they were initially 
exposed to an image for 5 seconds, after which 
a black screen appeared for another 5 seconds, 
and then this very image along with three other 
images; the first image sets the ‘pre-scenario’, 
whereas the latter set the decisional scenario.
Below we find a copy of a typical decision 
problem (ap-av) of our experiment.
procedure
Participants were initially informed that the 
images are all part of a large inventory and were 
previously ranked in terms of their respective 
valence by thousands of other lay subjects, who-
se social-demographic profiles resembled their 
own. They were also informed that, among the 
figures presented in the decision scenarios, there 
was always one that statistically surpassed the 
others in terms of preference/valence.
With this information in sight the instruction 
was to try to select the best rated figure (statisti-
cally) in each of the nine trials. In this sense, the 
task was not to select the image that appeared 
to be the most attractive in a personal basis, but 
the one that was assumed to be rated as so by a 
proportionally large number of lay people. Such 
a necessity to prospect intentional content from 
the mind of unknown subjects (adapted from 
theory of mind studies that we are also develo-
ping) represented our solution to the necessity 
to create problems that were sheltered from 
rational or partially rational solutions.
We also included in the presentation of the 
instructions the declaration that the experiment 
aimed to define (and rate people in relation to) 
one of the dimensions of Social IQ. The latter is 
a trend that we are really developing in a multi-
centric collaboration; it involves the application 
of several new tasks, including the first neuro-
Figure 1. Pre-scenario and decision scenario images of an av-av decision problem related to ‘faces’.
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psychological instrument capable of quantifying 
Theory of Mind performance: http://hq.oda.mat.
br/en/. This statement was finally associated 
to the commitment to provide data on personal 
performance after the completion of the task, 
in terms of its superiority, correspondence or 
inferiority to the average performance collected 
so far. This procedure aimed to increase personal 
adherence to the objectives of the experiment.
After completion of individual data capture, 
participants were asked about whether they 
believed our statements about the nature of 
the experiment and whether they really tried to 
find the correct answer (subjects declaring not 
having believed or not having tried to figure out 
the correct response were to be eliminated, but 
this did not prove to be necessary). Finally, all 
subjects were informed about the real structure 
of the experimental design and the reasons why it 
was impossible to actually rate their performance. 
While declaring that the images had diffe-
rent ranked valence, this study selected images 
whose valence were as statistically equilibrated 
as possible, thus ensuring that no simple solu-
tion was possible in any trial and safeguarding 
the challenge to standardize option selection in 
categorically diverse problems from biases that 
could emerge from a lack of internal consistency. 
The method used to achieve such a solution was 
to use IAPS images whose valence was as even 
as possible and to complement them with other 
figures judged by a group of other subjects to 
match the valence of these.
In this sense, this study also involved a both 
qualitative and quantitative pre-experiment 
(N = 8) with subjects matched by age and selected 
from the same environment as the subsequent 
participants of the study, which analyzed 24 IAPS 
images and 30 public domain images, in order 
to select 36 images of equivalent valence, to be 
included in the decision-making experiment.
measuring problem ‘intuitiveness’ 
electrophysiologically
 As said, we deducted from the lessons 
provided by experiments on somatic markers 
by Bechara et al. (2005), that the level of intui-
tiveness of a problem that cannot be solved by 
rational or near rational  means (hypothetical-
deductively) is inversely represented by the level 
of stress generated by option selection, so that 
more intuitive solutions can be defined as the 
ones that produce less stress, while problem ca-
tegorization can be herein regarded as a matter 
of ranking GSR values.
For instance, if we assume that subjects may 
vary in the time needed to pick options presen-
ted in the decision scenario for reasons that 
may be unrelated to the level of stress produced 
(which seems sensible to assume as a recurrent 
occurrence) and we opt to fix the measure to 
be compared as the GSR phasic response (that 
is, the integer of the curve defined by the total 
GSR activation generated from the moment that 
recording initiated to the moment that an op-
tion was selected), a bias would be immediately 
created. It is important to bear in mind the fact 
that stress does not match overall electrophy-
siological activation in every possible sense, at 
the same time that peaks in electrophysiological 
activation tend to match stress peaks (Kaplan & 
Nguyen, 2010). Therefore, this experiment used 
peak activation (‘GSR max’) as its core measure. 
programming the experimental design
In order to capture and synchronize GSR 
measures with the presentations of the images, 
a multi-media design was created using the sig-
nal processing software BioExplorer version 1.5 
(Cyber Evolution Inc.) and FLASH images (SWF), 
which were created using the Impress module of 
the Open Office software.  The design programmed 
in BioExplorer allows two independent interfa-
ces; one for the subject, where the images are 
shown, and one exclusively for the researcher, 
where graphics of real-time acquisition can be 
analyzed. The subject’s screen was displayed in 
a second computer screen, in order to aid the 
proper development of the experiment.
The researcher’s interface also includes a 
third, hidden screen, named signal diagram. This 
screen contains all the programming informa-
tion necessary to run the experiment, developed 
in the software’s intuitive ‘flowchart’ language. 
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Herein the statistics of interest are selected in 
order to be exported to .txt files, and be analyzed. 
Two problems emerged during the creation of the 
signal diagram: BioExplorer was not capable of 
receiving signals from SWF interfaces, and a time 
protection that seems not to have been foreseen 
by the software developers was needed in order 
to prevent variation in the time demanded to se-
lect an image affected the interval defined to the 
presentation of the next block of images. Both 
problems received original solutions that now 
can be applied to all other experimental designs 
to be developed with this software. 
Below we find a copy of the programming 
design that was created for this study, which 
will be made publicly available at www.creative-
commons.com.
Hardware and caption
This study involved the use of a six channel 
acquisition unit (I-330C from J&J Engineering 
Inc., Poulsbo, WA), a standard laptop computer 
(Sony Vaio), and an additional 19-inch monitor. 
Data were captured from the second and third 
fingers of the non-dominant hand, while the 
other hand was kept free to select the images.
Below we find a table with the most impor-
tant electrophysiological parameters.
results
To analyze the results of this experiment we 
created macros that automate the exportation 
of any set of selected data from the software’s 
Figure 2. Digital programming design created for this experiment, in the environment of the software BioExplorer. 
Electromyography (EMG) was recorded but not used, due to excessive noise.
Number of available channels: 6
Number of used channels: 2
Optical isolation: 400 VAC
Range of GSR caption:  0.5-100 μΩ
Impedance test of the electrodes: 250 ohms to two mega ohms
Impedance: 10 Gohms
Data sampling: 512 samples/second 
Artifact elimination: 60Hz line filter
Table 1
Main electrophysiological parameters
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basic output, which is rigidly processed in 1 
second epochs. These macros will also be made 
available in www.creativecommons.com.
Considering that GSR levels vary substantially 
from time to time and, most importantly, from 
person to person, our proposal to avoid biases 
in the establishment of the ‘intuitiveness’ of the 
different categories of problems was to divide 
the nine problems into three sets of categorica-
lly different problems (three problems per set, 
one ap-av, one av-av, and one ap-ap), and only 
one type of stimuli (faces, foods, landscapes/
locations), calculating performance by ranking 
stress level within each set.
Thus, data collection led to three ranks for 
each subject, before a final result was generali-
zed for the whole dataset. In sum, we concluded 
that cardinal but not ordinal preference was the 
best option to deal with natural variations in 
GSR levels, both by limiting the time window of 
sequential collection and comparison for each 
subject and by avoiding the direct comparison 
of GSR levels among different subjects.
Finally, we used Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon tests, using Stata software (Ha-
milton, 2003) to define the final intuitiveness rank.
By attributing the number ‘1’ to ap-av pro-
blems, the number ‘2’ to av-ap, and the number 
‘3’ to av-av problems, we found that the less 
intuitive type is ap-av, whereas av-ap and av-av 
have the same intuitiveness. The achievement of 
such conclusion can be tracked for the following 
overall results:
First we plotted the relative frequencies in 
which the different orders appeared. Next, we 
addressed the number of subjects to which 
each category of problems produced the higher 
stress level. Finally, we approached the relative 
intuitiveness of problems av-av (class 2) and 
av-ap (class 3). As one may note, while the for-
mer appears more in the first position (5 times 
vs. 3 times for av-ap), the latter appears more 
often in the second position (16 vs. 13 times 
for av-av). We considered that data collection 
ended with 90 classifications and proceeded as 
following: each time a category was classified as 
the most stressful, it received a ‘1’; each time it 
was the second, it received a ‘2’; and each time 
it was the third, it received a ‘3’, so that each 
category ended with 30 1-3 classifications, in 
relation to which the highest sum equals higher 
intuitiveness.
Having obtained these results, we used Krus-
kal-Wallis (for the three groups) and Mann-Whit-
ney-Wilcoxon (for 2x2 analyses) tests to rank them.
The former test showed a clear difference 
amongst categories (p = .0001), thus endorsing 
the perception of decreased intuitiveness of ap-av 
problems that can be easily seen in the previous 
figures. This finding was endorsed by 2x2 com-
parisons using Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests. 
The comparison of av-av and av-ap categories 
did not yield statistically significant differences 
(p = .5712), therefore suggesting that it was not 
possible by this means to statistically discriminate 
Figure 3. Stress level related to the different categories of 
problems represented by their relative frequencies.
Figure 4. Class 1 = subjects to whom ap-av was the most 
stressful category of problem. Class 2 = av-av as the most 
stressful. Class 3 = av-ap as the most stressful
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them in relation to relative intuitiveness, albeit 
it is still worth noting that av-av problems ap-
peared more in the first position than the latter.
    discussion
One thing that emerged from conducting this 
experiment is the perception that people adhered 
significantly to the task and with no reluctance 
in trying to figure out the imponderable. Why 
did no one complain or act as if the task was 
imponderable? This is a very interesting psycho-
logical trend on its own, which we speculate to 
relate with the proposition that most people tend 
to have a general limitation in seeing things as 
imponderable or random (for a discussion: Falk 
& Konold, 1997). 
From the perspective that adherence took 
place and will probably take place in replications 
of this study, the discovery that ap-av problems 
show the smallest intuitiveness of all studied 
problems suggests that a decrease in the overall 
utility of the options to be selected in a context 
were no rational selection is possible represents 
the core variable to hamper intuitiveness. To 
the extent that this finding can be generalized 
to real life situations, one may conclude it su-
ggests that as people may lose their faith due 
to deterioration of their options, they may lose 
intuitiveness with it.  
Along these lines of thought, the fact that av-av 
problems followed ap-av problems in occupying 
the first position among all three categories may 
be seen as an indication that the next significant 
psychological variable to intuitiveness is simply 
valence (in opposition to dynamic changes in valen-
ce). Up to the point that this applies to real world 
choices, one may hypothesize that intuitiveness 
increases with the rating of available options, in 
cases where an equilibrium that cannot be sol-
ved rationally is established. It is worth noting 
that we did not test ap-ap problems, but as long 
as these results define a hierarchy of potential 
intuitiveness, it is expected that ap-ap problems 
reveal to be the most intuitive. 
Together, one may speculate that these pers-
pectives endorse the idea that intuitiveness in 
decision-making is somehow related to hedonis-
tic experiences. This could explain why drops 
in valence turns the process of deciding in face 
of the imponderable so much more stressful 
(as evaluated electrophysiologically) than the 
recurrence of low valence scenarios. 
The extent to which our GSR data is the best 
possible correlate of intuitiveness is certainly 
open to debate. Our position is not that this 
is necessarily true, but that GSR is the most 
traditional and probably the most reliable elec-
trophysiological measure available, and for that 
reason appears to be the most sensible option 
to inaugurate a new line of explorations.
A greater question that remains open to debate 
is the extent to which these stress measures can be 
mapped into the concept of intuition/intuitiveness. 
Our position is that intuition and intuitiveness 
have several definitions, each of which carry tra-
ces generated  vis-à-vis the demands of different 
contexts. Considering that the problems that we 
are dealing with were not systematized in the same 
designs as before, it is easy to argue that such 
mapping does not hold. However, when we consider 
the ties that this use of intuition establishes with 
previous uses (especially in IGT-based research) 
and assume that the only means of selecting an 
option confidently in our experimental framework 
is by gut feelings, it becomes apparent that new 
uses of the concept makes sense and has a good 
chance of being incorporated both by lay people 
and the scientific community.
We actually go beyond this claim and assume 
that it can be said that the degree to which a de-
cision is intuitive relates with the level of stress 
that it evokes, provided that the problem as a 
whole is not treated analytically; that is, intuiti-
ve decision-making involves a decision style by 
which the agent uses his spontaneous attraction 
to the different options, while not analyzing them 
hypothetically-deductively, as the main decision 
criteria. In that same vein, problems and decision 
trees as a whole can be defined as more or less 
intuitive, in relation to their tendency to force the 
agent to appeal to gut feelings and in terms of the 
average degree of stress that they tend to evoke.
The current study introduces a new theore-
tical problem and some original ideas to shed 
light onto it, converging into an attempt to treat 
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the affective anchors that precede and influence 
decision-making under uncertainty; a new expe-
rimental design that can be used with a plethora 
of cheap-to-expensive acquisition devices (a list 
of which will be made available as this paper is 
published); and preliminary results regarding the 
intuitiveness of three types of problems, ap-av, av-
av, av-ap, based upon the assumption that this 
trend can generalized to sets of options in the same 
vein that it has been linked to decisions in the IGT.
This study has several limitations: our deci-
sional experiment involved a small N; it relied on 
non-conventional analyses (which were proposed 
to deal with natural limitations of GSR data that 
could easily bias the conclusions), and it was 
limited to few categories of conflict problems. 
For these reasons, we believe that it should 
be dealt with more n the lines of a proposal to 
start a new line of explorations, rather than as 
a flagship conclusive statement with definitive 
findings in intuitiveness in decision-making. On 
the other hand, it is interesting to note that it 
restated old conclusions regarding the particular 
stressfulness which Lewis found to be inherent 
to ap-av conflicts (Lewis, 1935), which now can 
be problematized within the context of intuition 
and decision-making.
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